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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Why Are Dividends Sticky?  (August 2005) 
Chun-Li Tsai, B.A., National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan; 
M.B.A., National Changhau University of Education, Changhau, Taiwan 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Dennis W. Jansen 
 
 This dissertation investigates the sluggish adjustment process of dividend 
payment in the stock market. First, I focus on the individual stocks. A casual 
investigation of observed dividends for individual stocks shows dividend adjustments 
are sluggish and discrete; this is not consistent with the Lintner’s stylized fact (1956) in 
which dividend adjustments are assumed to change continuously. Thus, I examine three 
possible explanations to account for dividend stickiness and discreteness: menu-costs 
(i.e. a constant adjustment cost), decision-making delays, and dividend adjustment 
asymmetry. I reject Dixit’s menu-cost model as an appropriate specification for the 
sluggish adjustment process of dividends. The empirical results imply that decision-
making delays and dividend adjustment asymmetry might be possible explanations for 
sticky and discrete dividends on selected individual stocks.  
Second, I focus on the aggregate stock market. I use a quadratic adjustment cost 
model to examine whether adjustment costs can explain the slow adjustment of 
aggregate dividends.  The empirical results suggest that adjustment costs might be a 
significant factor explaining the slow dividend adjustment for S&P 500. The value of 
relative weigh cost is related to the specification of target dividend. If target dividends 
 iv
are related to earnings, then the empirical results suggest that the adjustment costs are 
about forty-fold more important than the deviation cost between the actual dividend and 
the target level in determining the dynamic dividend adjustment process. If target 
dividends are specified as proportion to the stock prices, the adjustment costs are about 
fourteen-fold more important than the deviation cost between actual dividend and target 
level when managers determine the dividends.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In financial markets, the determinants of dividend payout rates are still not well 
understood. However, dividend-smoothing behavior in the stock market identified by 
Lintner (1956) is fairly widespread. There have been several attempts in the literature to 
find and explain the observed patterns of dividend payout. 
Lintner (1956) listed some stylized facts of dividend policies he discovered in 
interviews with corporate managers. These stylized facts are summarized as follows: (i) 
Most managers appeared to have in mind a target dividend and a long-run target payout 
ratio when they set dividends; (ii) Most managers wanted to avoid adjusting dividends; 
(iii) Many managers smooth dividend payouts in terms of current and past earnings. 
Lintner provided the first empirical specification of corporate dividend policy---“the 
partial adjustment process” to describe dividend adjustment behavior1. This adjustment 
process assumes managers adjust their dividends to the target levels. Lintner (1956), 
Fama and Harvey (1968) found earnings were the most important determinant of a 
change in dividends, and therefore specified target dividends as some percentage r  
(long-run target payout ratio) of earnings; Marsh and Merton (1987) and Kao and Wu 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style and format of Journal of Monetary Economics. 
 
1 Lintner (1956) suggested that corporate dividend decisions can be explained by the following partial 
adjustment process, 
)-( 1* ddbd ttt −=∆  
where b  is the speed of adjustment coefficient,  0 << b 1, and d t*  is the target dividend.  
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(1994) extended Lintner’s findings and proposed that dividend payouts are determined 
by permanent earnings, that is, target dividends are specified as some percentage r  of 
permanent earnings. 
 From Lintner’s list of stylized facts, dividend adjustments are assumed to be 
continuous with respect to the stochastic variations of the target dividend, defined by 
either earnings or permanent earnings. However, even a casual investigation of observed 
dividends for individual stocks shows that dividend adjustments are sluggish and 
discrete. The claim that dividends are smoothed over time is hardly controversial, but 
few studies examine the determinants of dividend smoothing and even fewer focus on 
the discreteness of the dividend adjustment process. Thus, the initial motivation of this 
research is to investigate the factors that could account for sticky and discrete dividends 
for individual stocks. 
Kumar and Lee (2001) developed the first empirical paper to investigate a 
discrete dividend adjustment even though target dividends change continuously. In this 
research, I examine three other possible explanations to account for dividend stickiness: 
menu-costs, decision-making delays, and dividend adjustment asymmetry.  The 
specifications in Davis and Hamilton (2004)2 are used to test these alternative 
explanations. I focus on the discreteness of the dividend adjustment process. Davis and 
Hamilton-type models are appropriate to be applied to investigate the sticky and discrete 
dividend behavior for the individual stocks because target dividends change 
continuously whereas actual dividends change only occasionally. 
                                                 
2 Davis and Hamilton (2004) originally proposed these three explanations to test the stickiness of 
wholesale gasoline prices. 
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For the first explanation---menu-costs (i.e. a constant adjustment cost) --- I use 
Dixit’s menu-cost model. The idea is to see if the dynamic and discrete dividend 
adjustment behavior can be described by this specification with a constant adjustment 
cost3. For the second explanation--- decision-making delays--- I use the Logit 
specification and the ACH (Autoregressive Conditional Hazard) model4. The Logit 
specification allows me to model the probability of a dividend change, and the ACH 
model captures the probability of a dividend change based on the past durations between 
changes in dividends and other explanatory variables. For the third explanation--- 
dividend adjustment asymmetry--- I use the Logit specification with asymmetry. 
In Chapter II of my dissertation, I provide a brief review of the literature and 
analyze the Dixit’s menu-cost model, the Logit specification, and the ACH model. In 
Chapter III, I test these three explanations for dividend stickiness on selected individual 
stocks. The empirical result shows the adjustment behavior of dividend is inconsistent 
with the menu-cost model of Dixit (1991). I find decision-making delays and dividend 
adjustment asymmetry might be possible alternative explanations for selected individual 
stocks. 
The empirical results in Chapter III indicate the menu-cost model is not the 
appropriate specification in accounting for the dividend adjustment process. In Chapter 
IV, I use an alternative specification --- a quadratic adjustment cost model--- to examine 
the question of whether adjustment costs can explain the slow adjustment of dividends in 
                                                 
3 Davis and Hamilton (2004) used Dixit’s menu-cost model to investigate whether this specification can 
describe the dynamic sticky and discrete adjustment of individual wholesale gasoline prices to continuous 
changes in bulk spot gasoline prices. 
4  ACH model proposed by Hamilton and Jorda (2002) was originally used to forecast the federal funds 
rate targets, which are discrete-valued time series.  
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the aggregate stock market. I derive a dynamic dividend adjustment process and apply a 
two-step methodology to estimate the structural parameters in the Euler equation.  The 
empirical results suggest adjustment costs might be a significant factor explaining the 
slow dividend adjustment for S&P 500.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
LITERATURE AND THE EMPIRICAL MODELS 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 Corporate dividend policy is an important issue in the financial literature. 
Although most researchers have recognized dividend smoothing in the stock market, 
only a few studies have investigated the determinants of dividend smoothing. Lintner 
(1956) developed the partial adjustment specification to explain the sluggish adjustment 
of dividends. However, Lintner’s model is not consistent with the discrete dividends in 
most stocks, since it implied that dividend adjustments are continuous with respect to the 
stochastic variations in target dividends5.  
 Although it is known that dividends are generally rigid and discrete, few studies 
in financial literature analyze the dynamic models of discrete dividends; the primary 
reason for this being absence of the theory on the discreteness of dividends.  Kumar and 
Lee’s (2001) paper was the first to develop and empirically implement a dynamic 
discrete dividend model for proposing some determinants of smoothing dividends. They 
showed that dividend smoothing is positively associated with the factors that adversely 
impact of the investor’s demand.  These factors include risk factors: higher earnings 
                                                 
5 Cyert, Kang, and Kumar (1996) found the observed dividends are discrete in most firms; they estimated 
the average length, which stocks remained unchanged dividends, is 6.5 quarters in the NYSE sample of 
309 stocks for the period 1972-1995. 
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variance, lower liquidity, and higher probability of bankruptcy, as well as the lower 
expected return on capital investment by the firm.  
 The primary objective of this research is to uncover the additional determinants 
of sticky and discrete dividends. I accomplish this by analyzing the link between the 
discrete dividends and three alternative explanations. These are menu-costs, decision-
making delays, and dividend adjustment asymmetry.  These three explanations originally 
were proposed by Davis and Hamilton (2004) to test the stickiness of wholesale gasoline 
price. Since the adjustments of individual wholesale gasoline prices are also sticky and 
discrete with respect to continuous changes in bulk spot gasoline prices, Davis and 
Hamilton-type models seem appropriate to empirically examine the explanations of 
sticky and discrete dividends. 
I next review the literature for the stock market. The literature examines how 
managers set dividends. It connects Davis and Hamilton’s specifications to the 
adjustment behavior of dividend. 
The partial adjustment process proposed by Lintner (1956) is the first known 
empirical specification of corporate dividend decisions. However, it was based on a set 
of interviews with managers about their dividend policies. Thus, Garrett and Priestley 
(2000) developed Lintner’s partial adjustment equation by deriving the manager’s 
optimal strategy of setting dividend within a theoretical specification.  
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In Garrett and Priestley’s specification, managers are assumed to minimize the 
quadratic cost function of dividend adjustment6. Managers are penalized for the 
deviations of dividends from their target levels and the deviations of dividend growth 
rate from a constant rate (α ).  An agency cost between managers and shareholders 
(Rozeff, 1982) is incurred by the firm whenever the actual dividend is below the target 
level ( dd tt *< ). The agency cost is an implicit cost and arises from the conflict between 
managers and shareholders. Assuming that managers hold a lower fraction of the stocks 
than shareholders, when managers hold more retained earnings (managers pay dividends 
below target dividends, dd tt *< ), they may use these retained earnings to invest in 
projects inefficiently. Thus, the agency costs arise. The positive deviations of actual 
dividends from the target levels ( dd tt *> ) also could make firms lose. When dividends 
are larger than target dividends, and assuming that external finance is costly, higher 
dividend payouts may cause firms to lose the opportunity of reinvesting earnings on 
projects paying above-market rates of return.  
In Garrett and Priestley’s (2000) model, managers at each period are assumed to 
minimize the loss resulting from the deviations of dividends from their target levels. 
That is, managers consider the deviation cost of dd tt *-  when they set the dividend. Thus, 
the deviation between the current dividend and target level should be an important factor 
influencing the probability of a dividend change in the next period.   
                                                 
6 The quadratic cost function is as following, 
2
2
2*
1 )-()-( αθθ dddC ttt ∆+=  
where θ 1 and θ 2 are the loss weights in managers’ mind, d t  is observed dividend, d t*  is target dividend 
and α is one constant growth rate of dividend.  
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 In addition, Marsh and Merton (1987) point out one of Lintner’s important 
stylized facts (1956) in the stock market; most managers avoid making changes in 
dividends since the potential costs could arise if managers change the dividends.  There 
are some sources of potential adjustment costs managers might face. For example, 
Garrett and Priestly (2000) mentioned a nonstable dividend policy could increase the 
uncertainties of managers’ decisions and therefore increase the management costs. 
Another source, dividends might convey the information of the future stock price to 
investors7. Thus, managers are extremely reluctant to cut dividends because they are 
worried about sending a bad signal to investors. Further, managers are slow to increase 
dividends because they want to minimize the probability that they have to cut the 
dividends in the future. Garrett and Priestly (2000) mentioned a stable dividend policy 
could smooth investors’ reactions. It can lower the likelihood of losing investors’ 
confidences in the stock’s future valuations.  
According to the Dixit’s model, the deviation dd tt *-  and menu-costs (i.e. a 
constant adjustment cost) are the two most important factors influencing the probability 
of a dividend change in the next period. Thus, the Dixit’s functional form seems 
reasonable for investigating the dynamic adjustment process of dividend. I next 
summarize why the Dixit’s model is an appropriate specification of dividend payout for 
the individual stocks. 
                                                 
7 There is a substantial literature (Michaely, Thaler, and Womack ,1995; Kao and Wu, 1994; and Healy 
and Palepu,1988) showing that the price of a firm’s stock rises (falls) when the firm announces a dividend 
increase (decrease). 
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 The Dixit’s model is believed to be a proper specification to investigate the 
dividend adjustment process since it can satisfy four main aspects of stock market that  
reflect the dividend policy of observed payout strategies. Firstly, as noted earlier, in 
Garrett and Priestley’s specification, the optimal response of managers when setting 
dividends is to consider the loss of dividends deviating from target levels. One of the 
important elements in the Dixit’s model includes the difference between the dividend 
and target level. Secondly, the solution of Dixit’s model can control the discreteness of 
the dividend adjustment even though target dividends change continuously. Then the 
specification can capture the discreteness of the dividend adjustment process. Thirdly, if 
dividends are smoothing, the test specification should concern the long-run horizon. The 
Dixit’s model can solve the adjustment loss of changing dividend by setting up the 
minimization problem for the entire time horizon from current period to infinity. 
Fourthly, the adjustment costs could arise when managers change the dividends. In the 
Dixit’s menu-cost model, the adjustment costs can be assumed to be constant when 
managers change the dividends. Managers strategically choose the quarters at which to 
change dividend so as to minimize the total adjustment loss of changing dividends.  
 I find in many respects, the Dixit’s framework appears consistent with the 
features of dividend payouts for the individual stocks.  That is, Dixit’s model implies a 
particular functional form of manager’s behavior on setting dividends.  
This research uses Dixit’s model as the starting point to investigate the patterns 
managers could use on deciding dividends. In Dixit’s specification, the deviation dd tt *-  
helps predict a dividend change. Hence, all the other specifications (Logit specification, 
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and ACH model), which are used to examine decision-making delays and dividend 
adjustment asymmetry for sticky dividends (Davis and Hamilton, 2004), also include the 
deviation term dd tt *- .  These specifications allow me to interpret whether these 
explanations are consistent with the behavior of dynamic dividend adjustments.  
 To test the above three explanations, I use three methods.  The remainder of this 
chapter describes these models as follows. In section 2.2, I give a description of Dixit’s 
menu-cost model (1991). In section 2.3, I describe the Logit model. In section 2.4, I 
describe the ACH model. 
2.2. The Dixit menu-cost model 
In the Dixit’s model, managers are assumed to minimize the total loss resulting 
from the deviation cost of dividends from target levels and the constant adjustment cost 
of changing dividends. Since the adjustment costs arise when mangers change the 
dividend, managers choose quarters ..., 21 tt  in which to change dividend so as to 
minimize the following adjustment loss function of dividends: 
[ ]{ }∑ )-((∞
1
2* t
1 10 =
∫ +
− −i
t
t
t
t
tt
i
i
i
i
egdtddkeE ββ
                                                              
(2.1) 
with  )()( 0*0 tdtd =  given 
and )()(* tdBtdd σ=  
Let tid 1− denote the previous dividend determined by managers, )(tB  is a standard 
Brownian motion. σ  is the standard deviation of the change in the target dividends, 
)(* td .  β  is the discount factor, and g  is the lump-sum adjustment cost (called the 
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menu cost in this model) when dividends change at  quarters ..., 21 tt . The parameter k  
scales the quadratic unit cost of deviating from the target dividend d t* .  
Since managers are assumed to wait to change a dividend in order to avoid the 
adjustment costs, they choose to either keep dividends unchanged or set dividends as the 
target levels with respect to the variations of target dividends at each period. If the target 
dividend evolves stochastically, then there are two points, one is below target dividend 
and another is above, at which managers will change the dividends. Dixit (1991) and 
Hansen (1999) showed the solution in Eq. (2.2), which managers change the dividend 
and set actual dividend equal to target dividend, )(* tdd iti = , when bdd tt ii =*-1-  happens 
in any quarter ti , with the optimal maximal deviation b  given by  
4
1
26 

=
k
gb σ                                                                                                   (2.2) 
 From Eq. (2.2), some static comparative economic intuition in the stock market 
can be obtained. First, if the menu costs increase, it is more costly to adjust the 
dividends. Then the range of inaction widens, managers could postpone the decision on 
changing a dividend. Second, if k , which scales the quadratic unit cost of deviating 
from d t*  , is larger, then the adjustment loss of being out of target dividend is greater and 
therefore, the zone becomes more narrow.  
Suppose mangers determine whether to adjust the dividends by following the 
above policy, then the probability that the dividend changes between quarter t and t+1 
can be estimated by the following, 
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Prob( )- * 1 bdd tt >+                                                                                              (2.3) 
Davis and Hamilton (2004) derived the probability of bdd tt >+* 1- . It is labeled 
[ ]ddh tt *, ,  and  can be approximated by (see Appendix) 
[ ] =ddh tt *, )--( *σ bdd ttΦ + )-(-1
*
σ
bdd tt +Φ                                                       (2.4) 
where Φ  is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal variable. In the 
observed discrete-time data on dividends, let 1=xt  if the dividend changes in quarter t 
and zero otherwise. The log of the likelihood of observing the sample { }xxx T,...,, 21  is 
then given by  
[ ]{ }∑ ),(1log)1(),(log1
0
*
1
*
1
T
t
tttttt ddhxddhx= ++
−−+
                                                  
(2.5) 
b , σ in Eq. (2.4) are chosen to maximize the log of the likelihood in Eq (2.5). 
The parameter estimates of b  and σ  imply an estimate of the expected time interval 
between changes in the dividends and can be used to judge whether this menu-cost 
model is an appropriate specification of the dividend process. 
 
2.3. The Logit model 
 The Logit specification is used to examine the possible explanations based on a 
decision-making delay and on dividend adjustment asymmetry. In the Logit model, Eq. 
(2.6), the probability of a dividend change at t+1, ht 1+ , depends on a vector of variables 
Z t  which are used to forecast the probability to a dividend change. Hence, 
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e
eh Z
Z
t
t
t δ
δ
'
'
1
1 +=+
                                                                                                  
 (2.6) 
where δ  is the parameters multiplying  Z t . 
Given this probability ht 1+ , I can evaluate the log likelihood function. Let 1=xt  
if dividend changes in quarter t and zero otherwise. The parameter vector δ  is estimated 
by maximizing the likelihood function given in Eq. (2.7), 
{ }∑ )-1log()-1(log1-
0
1111
T
t
tttt hxhx
=
++++ +                                                                     (2.7) 
 
2.4. The autoregressive conditional hazard model 
Since dividends are generally discrete for individual stocks, the disadvantage of 
using the traditional Logit model is that significant serial correlation could arise. The 
discreteness of dividend also implies that the lagged time interval between dividend 
changes may be relevant for the timing of the next dividend change. Thus, I use an 
alternative model, the Autoregressive Conditional Hazard specification (ACH), to model 
the serial dependences and lagged time intervals in discrete-valued dividend series. This 
model was proposed by Hamilton and Jorda (2002). It can remove the serial correlation 
properties in the dynamics of the limited dependent dividend variable. In addition to 
taking account of the expected duration of dividend changes, this model also 
incorporates updated explanatory variables, which may help forecast the probability of a 
dividend change.  
The ACH model was developed originally from the ACD (Autoregressive 
Conditional Duration) model proposed by Engle and Russell (1998). In Engle and 
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Russel’s ACD (m, r) specification, let n describe the cumulative number of dividend 
changes, un  denotes the length of quarters between the nth and (n+1)th time at which 
managers change the dividend payouts. ψ n  represents the expectation of un  given past 
observations uuu nn 12-1- ...,  as the following equation,  
ψβαψ jn
r
j
jjn
m
j
jn u −==
+= ∑∑
1
-
1                                                                                   
(2.8) 
 For example, the ACD (1, 1) model forms the expectation ψ n as the following 
uuuuu nnnnnn
1-
1
2-
3-
2
2-1 ... αβαβαββααψ +++++= −                                       (2.9) 
where u  is the average length of quarters observed between changes in dividends. Engle 
and Russell (1998) denoted the probability of a divided change in quarter  t+1 as 
ψ )(1
1
tn
th =+                                                                                                         (2.10) 
 
Hamilton and Jorda (2002) proposed the ACH specification that can generalize 
the ACD model, in which the probability of a dividend change at period t+1 is function 
of linearly on expected durations ψ )(tn  and other variables Z t . Let )(tn  denote the 
number of times manager has been observed to change dividends of quarter t. Then Eq. 
(2.11) is one general expression of ACH model, 
Z
h
ttn
t ξψ ')(1
1
+=+
                                                                                             
(2.11) 
where ht 1+  is the hazard rate, that is , it is the probability of a dividend change in  quarter 
t+1, Z t  denotes a vector of other variables which can help predict the probability of a 
dividend change in  quarter t+1 and these variables are known at time t. 
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It is important to confirm that the hazard rate ht 1+  is not outside of (0, 1). Hence, 
Hamilton and Jorda proposed (2002) the following function Eq. (2.13) to smooth 
transition such that the following hazard rate always lies in [ ]1,0 , 
[ ]Zh ttnt ξψλ ')(1
1
+=+
                                                                                        
(2.12) 
The denominator in Eq. (2.12) is specified by the following,  
If   [ ] 1')( ≤+ Z ttn ξψ  ,  
                                                            then , [ ] 0001.1')( =+ Z ttn ξψλ  
If     [ ] ∆+<+< 0')( 11 Z ttn ξψ  ,  where 1.0≡0∆  
                                                            then, [ ]
2'
)(
2
0
2'
)(0'
)( )1-(
)1-(2
0001.1
Z
Z
Z
ttn
ttn
ttn ξψ
ξψξψλ ++∆
+∆+=+  
If      [ ] ∆+≥+ 0')( 1   Z ttn ξψ , where 1.0≡0∆   
                                                            then, [ ] [ ]ZZ ttnttn ξψξψλ ')(')( 0001.1 ++=+      ( 2.13) 
Therefore, I have one differentiable smooth function for the transition of values 
between 1.1 and 1.0001 for Eq. (2.12). The numerical procedure can select a value of 
ht 1+  inside of (0, 1). 
Given the hazard rate in Eq. (2.12), the log likelihood function is estimated. In 
the observed discrete-time on dividends, let 1=xt  if the dividend changes in quarter t 
and zero otherwise. The log of the likelihood of observing the sample { }xxx T,...,, 21  is 
then given by  
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{ }∑ )-1log()1(log)( 1-
0
111111
T
t
tttt hxhxL
=
++++ −+=θ
                                                   
(2.14) 
where θ 1  is the vector of parameters to influence the probability of a dividend change in 
Eq (2.12). This vector of parameters is estimated by maximizing Eq. (2.14). I use the 
ACH model to examine if decision-making delays can explain the sluggish adjustment 
of dividends. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS ON INDIVIDUAL STOCKS: 
WHY ARE DIVIDENDS STICKY AND DISCRETE?  
 
3.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I use Dixit’s model as the starting point to investigate possible 
explanations for the observed patterns of dividends. Three alternative explanations are 
tested. These are menu-costs, decision-making delays, and dividend adjustment 
asymmetry. 
The Dixit’s menu-cost model is used to see if dynamic dividend adjustment can 
be explained in terms of menu-costs (i.e. a constant adjustment cost). In the second 
explanation--- decision-making delays--- I use the Logit specification and the ACH 
model. In the third explanation--- dividend adjustment asymmetry--- I use the Logit 
specification with asymmetry to investigate it. 
 I first describe the economic intuition behind these three explanations. The first 
explanation is associated with adjustment costs; the potential costs managers face when 
they change dividends. The adjustment costs in this chapter are assumed to be constant 
and invariant to the magnitude of the change in dividends. Such costs are labeled menu-
costs in Dixit’s model. In response to a change in the target dividend, managers either 
make no change in dividends or else adjust dividends to the target, thus increasing an 
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adjustment cost. If it is costly to adjust dividends, managers might keep dividends 
unchanged for a substantially run of periods, before inacting a change. 
A second possible explanation for dividend stickiness is a decision-making delay 
in dividend adjustment. This explains the discreteness of dividend adjustment. This 
delay might be a literal time-lag in decision-making.  If managers need a length of time 
to process information about the stochastic target dividend, then dividend stickiness 
might result. This is just a decision delay and differs from the menu-cost model, in 
which managers are concerned with the physical cost of changing dividend. 
A third possible explanation for dividend stickiness is that managers are 
concerned with the responses of investors. An increase in dividends may reduce the 
funds available to managers, and therefore remove agency costs (Crutchely and Hansen, 
1989; Easterbrook, 1984). Managers are more likely to increase dividends and hence 
reduce the agency loss when actual dividend is less than target dividend ( dd tt *< ), since 
higher dividends can send a good signal to investors. Managers are supposed to be 
relatively more reluctant to cut dividends when dd tt *> , since they are worried about 
investors’ confidence in the stock’s future valuations.  Asymmetric dividend adjustment 
explains dividend sluggishness since it reflects strategic considerations about investors’ 
response to a dividend adjustment.  Although this asymmetric specification is contrary to 
the assumption of Dixit’s model, there is significant evidence for asymmetric dynamic 
adjustment of dividends on selected individuals stocks.  
I first select six stocks to examine whether the three explanations can account for 
sticky and discrete dividend. I further compare the predictions of a dividend change 
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among the Dixit’s model, the alternative Logit, and the ACH specification. I hope to 
shed light on which of the there explanations most accurately describe the sticky and 
discrete dividend process for the individual stocks. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.2, describes the data 
used in this chapter. In section 3.3, estimates the target dividends.  In section 3.4, reports 
the empirical results for the menu-cost model. In section 3.5, uses the Logit and the 
ACH model to investigate the decision-making delays. In section 3.6, uses the Logit 
model to investigate the asymmetric dividend adjustment. In section 3.7, presents the 
main conclusion.  
 
3.2. Data 
The data used in this chapter are extracted from Compustat. The variables are 
composed of quarterly dividends, and stock prices8. I restrict my sample to six stocks, 
GE, NY Times, Duquesne Light Holdings INC (Duquesne), MEG Energy INC (MEG), 
Murphy Oil Corp (Murphy), and Midland Co (Midland)9. I investigate whether any of 
these three explanations listed above can account for dividend stickiness in each of these 
                                                 
8 In order to deal with stock splits, all the variables are deflated by the default cumulative adjustment 
factor of Compustat. 
9 Since the target dividends in managers’ mind are unobservable and there has been difficulty in 
measuring them precisely, I select only the stocks whose parameter estimates are consistent with the 
menu-cost model. The empirical results  for 15 other individual stocks  either did not  converge or did not 
produce reasonable estimates in the menu-cost model.(stock Exxon, Bank of NY, Bank of America, 
Piedmont Natural Gas Co, International Paper Co., Carpenter Technology Corp, Handleman Co., Genuine 
Part Co., Air Products & Chemical INC., INTL Business Machine Corp, Motorola INC, CMS Energy 
Corp, PG&E Corp, General Mills INC, Dow Chemical) 
 
 
 20
stocks. Figure 3.1 plots the dividends and stock prices of these six stocks. It is found that 
the dividends are rigid and discrete.  
 
3.3. Estimating the target dividend series 
To complete this analysis, my first step is to estimate the target dividends. 
Previous studies including Marsh and Merton (1987), Kao and Wu (1994), Kumar and 
Lee (2001) specified target dividends as proportion to the permanent earnings as in Eq. 
(3.1). 
Yrd Ptt =*                                                                                                             (3.1) 
Here d t*  is the target dividend and defined as a percentage r  of permanent earnings, 
Y Pt . Lintner called r  the long run target payout ratio, and suggested the ratio is constant; 
10 <≤ r . 
Marsh and Merton (1987) employed the stock price as a measure of permanent 
earnings. Thus, I follow Marsh and Merton (1987) and assume stock price is a proxy for 
a stock’s permanent earnings.  
 The long run target payout ratio, r , is estimated as the constant average markup 
of dividends over the permanent earnings10. That is, 
∑1ˆ
1
T
i
t
t
p
d
T
r
=
=                                                                                                          (3.2) 
where T  is the number of quarters over the samples in each stock.  
                                                 
10 Kumar and Lee (2001) also used the same method to estimate the long-run target payout ratio.  
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 The estimates of rˆ  are reported in the first row of Table 3.1. Then, the target 
dividends are estimated by Eq. (3.3), 
Prd tt ˆˆ
* =                                                                                                              (3.3) 
For a preliminary analysis of dividend payouts, Figures 3.2 plots the dividends 
with corresponding target dividends estimated by Eq. (3.3). Figures 3.3 plots the 
deviation between the actual and target dividends, dd tt *− . 
 Target dividends are assumed to follow a random walk in the Dixit’s menu-cost 
model. Hence, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test without lagged terms, Eq. (3.4), is used 
to examine. 
ες ttt dd +=∆ ˆˆ * 1-*                                                                                                   (3.4) 
Eq. (3.4) is employed to test the null hypothesis of 0=ς . As shown in Table 3.2, 
for all the stocks, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 5% level of significance. 
Hence, the results show target dividends I estimated by Eq. (3.3) are consistent with the 
assumption of the Dixit’s menu-cost model in which target dividends are assumed to 
follow a random walk.  
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Fig. 3.1. Stock price and actual dividend 
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Fig. 3.2. Target dividend and actual dividend 
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Table 3.1 
Menu-cost model estimation  
Stock GE NY Times Duquesne MEG Murphy Midland 
rˆ  0.00858 0.00592 0.01950 0.01901 0.00643 0.00470 
bMLE  0.4690*** 
(0.0575) 
0.1371*** 
(0.0288) 
0.2805*** 
(0.0219) 
0.2256*** 
(0.0651) 
0.0772*** 
(0.0058) 
0.0086 
(0.0575) 
σ MLE  0.3067*** 
(0.0348) 
0.0920*** 
(0.0199) 
0.1202*** 
(0.0121) 
0.1726*** 
(0.0523) 
0.0273*** 
(0.0020) 
0.0043 
(0.0348) 
σ direct  0.0176 0.0148 0.0403 0.0220 0.0153 0.0057 
bdirect  0.0233 0.0050 0.0133 0.0044 0.0125 0.0021 
σ 2
2
MLE
MLEb  
 
2.3377 
 
2.2186 
 
5.4402 
 
1.7085 
 
7.9749 
 
4.0012 
log L -76.7392 -79.9871 -70.3930 -79.1529 -48.3683 -64.1263 
Obs 146 149 162 138 149 142 
Notes: Asymptotic Standard errors are in the parentheses. Asterisk (*) denotes statistically significant at 
the 10% level. Double-asterisk (**) denotes statistically significant at the 5% level. Tri-asterisk (***) 
denotes statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
Table 3.2 
Random walk test on target dividends 
Stock Lag Order ADF  t-statistic Critical Value 
GE 0 0.077416 -1.943042 
NY Times 0 0.862802 -1.942996 
Duquesne 0 -0.744392 -1.942818 
MEG 0 1.687259 -1.943175 
Murphy 0 2.678637 -1.942996 
Midland 0 1.765368 -1.943107 
Note: Critical values are at 5% significance level. 
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3.4. Empirical results for the menu-cost model 
I first use the Dixit’s menu-cost model to forecast the quarters in which a 
manager would change his dividend payout.  The Dixit’s model is summarized as 
following, 
[ ]{ }∑ )-((∞
1
2* t
1 10 =
∫ +
− −i
t
t
t
t
tt
i
i
i
i
egdtddkeE ββ
                                                              
(3.5) 
with )()( 0*0 tdtd =  given 
and )()(* tdBtdd σ=  
 Managers change the dividend and set actual dividend equal to target dividend, 
)()( * tdtd ii = , when bdd tt ii =− *-1  happens in any quarter t i ( by the solution of Dixit 
1991; Hansen, 1999). Davis and Hamilton (2004) derived the probability of a dividend 
change between quarter t and t+1 as [ ]ddh tt *, ,  
[ ]=ddh tt *, )--( *σ bdd ttΦ + )-(-1
*
σ
bdd tt +Φ                                                        (3.6) 
where d t  denotes the actual dividend payout, and d t*  as the target dividend, Φ  is the 
cumulative distribution function of a standard normal variable. σ  is the standard 
deviation of the change in the target dividends, b  is the optimal maximal deviation 
between actual and target dividend. 
 Let dd ttt *-≡∆  be the gap between dividend and target level, and ∑T≡
1
1-
_ T
t
t
=
∆∆  is 
the average markup for each stock.  I replaced dd tt *-  in Eq (3.6) with ∆∆ _-t , the value 
of the deviation of the actual dividend from the target level. In Eq. (3.7), let 1=xt  if the 
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dividend changes in quarter t and zero otherwise. I choose b  and σ  in Eq (3.6) so as to 
maximize the following Eq. (3.7) 
[ ]{ }∑ ),(1log)1(),(log1-
0
*
1
*
1
T
t
tttttt ddhxddhx= ++
−−+                                                   (3.7) 
Table 3.1 shows the results of the menu-cost model estimation for six stocks. The 
maximum likelihood estimates of b  and σ  are reported in the second and third rows in 
Table 3.1. The b  estimates range between 0.0086---0.4690 among the six stocks. The σ  
values, the standard deviation of change in the target dividends, vary between 0.0043---
0.3067 per quarter. The empirical results imply that the structure interpretation of the 
estimated coefficients is not so consistent with the dividend data, since these estimated 
values b , σ  seem too large.  Hence I examine the plausibility of the estimated value of 
b  and σ . 
In order to examine the plausibility of the estimated parameter, bMLE , I directly 
estimate bdirect  by finding the median absolute value of the change in dividend for those 
quarters when managers adjust their dividends. The results are reported in the fifth row 
of Table 3.1. I also directly estimate the parameter σ , which corresponds to the standard 
deviation of changes in d t* .  The direct estimator σ direct  can be inferred by the standard 
deviation of dd tt * 1* −−  and are reported in the fourth row of Table 3.1.  
These σ MLE  estimated by menu-cost model are larger than those values of σ direct  
in five of the six stocks. This might be a problematic result for the suitability of the 
menu-cost model.  I interpret that this problem comes from the difficulty in forecasting 
the target dividends. Since target dividends are unobservable, stock prices are used as the 
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proxies of estimating target dividends. However, stock prices are relatively more volatile 
than actual dividends. In other words, the estimated target dividend d tˆ
*  could fluctuate 
more than true target dividend d t* . If the proxy of managers’ target dividends, d tˆ
* , differs 
from the true target dividends d t*  ( d tˆ
* = d t* + ut , ut  is the measurement error), this might 
account for an overly large estimated value forσ MLE . 
 Another issue on the plausibility of the parameter b , the bMLE  estimated by 
menu-cost model are also significantly larger than those b  calculated by median 
absolute value of change in dividends in all the six stocks. In order to fit the observed 
infrequency of dividend changes, Davis and Hamilton (2004) needed to assume that both 
the uncertainty about future target dividends (σ ) and the amount by which it changes 
the dividend (b ) are quite large in the Dixit’s model. If this model imputes much more 
uncertainty about the target dividends than is warranted by the data, then it might 
account for much larger dividend changes than the managers actually make. σ direct  and 
bdirect  can be inferred directly from the data other than the frequency of dividend 
adjustment, Davis and Hamilton (2004) concluded these inferred values are an order of 
magnitude smaller than the structure estimates σ MLE and bMLE .  
 However, I find that the ratios σ 2
2
MLE
MLEb  are acceptable numbers given a menu-cost 
interpretation of setting dividend, although the level of bMLE  is much lager than can be 
reconciled with the observed magnitude of dividend changes, and the level of σ MLE  is 
also much larger than can be reconciled with the difficulty in estimating the true target 
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dividends11. These ratios are reported in the sixth row of Table 3.1. The value of σ 2
2
MLE
MLEb  
implies an estimate of the expected time interval between changes in the dividends and 
can be used to judge whether this menu-cost model is an appropriate specification of the 
dividend process. 
 Managers want to find the optimal boundary at which a dividend changes so as to 
minimize the total loss in Eq. (3.5). Hansen(1999) solved [ ]0)0()0(| * =− ddTE , the 
expected length of a cycle which is defined as the time interval until resetting the 
dividend as the following,  
[ ] σ 2
2
* 0)0()0(| bddTE ==−                                                                               (3.8) 
Hence, the parameter estimates of b  and σ  imply an estimate of the expected 
time interval of changing dividend. It is also a measure of the expected frequency of 
changing dividend. From the results of menu-cost model estimation in Table 3.1, the 
σ 2
2
MLE
MLEb  values are below 2 quarters in one of six stocks, between 2 and 2.5 quarters in two 
stocks, and the value of σ 2
2
MLE
MLEb   for Murphy is 7.9749, for Midland is 4.0012, and for 
Duquesne is 5.4402. I also estimate directly the average time intervals between changes 
in the dividends from the data for each stock. Table 3.3 shows the direct average 
duration in terms of quarter, u direct  and the difference from the estimated length of a 
                                                 
11 Davis and Hamilton (2004) found that the parameter estimates imply a ratio of 
σ 26
b  that is reasonable 
given a menu-cost interpretation of pricing gasoline, although both estimated levels of  b  and σ  are 
much larger than the direct estimators of b  and σ . 
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cycle σ 2
2
MLE
MLEb . I find the direct average duration, udirect , is larger than the estimated expected 
time interval of one cycle, σ 2
2
MLE
MLEb , in all six stocks. The difference is larger than 1.5 
quarters in five stocks.  I interpret that although managers face the adjustment cost, g  
when they reset the dividend, it still leads to non-rigid dividend changes. That result 
implies that menu-cost model cannot describe the sluggish adjustment process of 
dividends properly.  
 
Table 3.3: 
The average duration between changes of the dividends 
Stock GE NY Times Duquesne MEG Murphy Midland 
udirect  4.0968 4.000 6.2000 3.8000 9.8571 5.7826 
difference 1.7591 1.7814 0.7598 2.0915 1.8822 1.7814 
Notes: u direct  is the average time interval directly estimated between changes in the dividend. 
            The difference is defined as udirect - σ 2
2
MLE
MLEb . 
 
 Although adjustment cost of changing dividends is probably an important factor 
in account for sticky dividends, the Dixit’s model appears to be inconsistent with the 
dividend data. Possible explanations for the inconsistency are: (1) The target dividends 
estimated by stock prices seem more volatile than the true target dividends. That causes 
the inconsistency between dividend adjustments and the structure interpretation of the 
estimated coefficients in the Dixit’s model. (2) Managers take the adjustment costs of 
changing dividends into account on deciding a dividend change. However, the 
adjustment costs might not be constant. They could be positively related with the 
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magnitude of deviation between changes in the dividends. (3) From the implication of 
agency cost issues with respect to dividend policy, dividend adjustment could be 
symmetric. However, the asymmetric dividend adjustments in the stock market arise due 
to the dividend signal issues. The dividend data cannot be completely consistent with the 
symmetric adjustment policy of the Dixit’s solution. Thus, these above reasons could 
cause that Dixit’s model cannot describe the dividend adjustment process properly. 
 To analyze dynamic dividend adjustment statistically, I use two other theoretical 
models, which can handle the dynamics of discrete changes of dividends. One is Logit 
specification; another is ACH model that takes the duration between changes in the 
dividends into account. I next compare the performances among these three models. 
Comparison results among models 
I first compare the menu-cost model with the Logit specification. As in the 
Dixit’s model, the difference between actual and target dividend is an important element 
influencing the probability of a dividend change. Hence, I first consider a Logit model in 
which the probability of a dividend change depends on the same variable dd tt *−  as in 
the Dixit’s model. Moreover, dd tt *−  is taken the absolute values in Eq. (3.9), since the 
dividend change is assumed to be symmetric as in menu-cost model, in which optimal 
boundary is symmetric.   
Thus, this specification in the Logit model I have: 
( )'*,1 ddZ ttt −=
                                                                                                 
(3.9) 
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Table 3.4 presents the results of the Logit model estimation [with Eq (3.9)] for 
the six stocks. If the coefficient of the absolute value of the difference is positive, that 
means once the actual dividend gets far away from the target dividend, managers might 
more likely to adjust the dividends. The results show that the gap is positively correlated 
with the probability of a dividend change in five of six stocks, although the test values 
are not statically significant. 
The values of the log likelihood function with the Logit model are compared with 
those for the Dixit’s menu-cost model [Eq. (3.6) and Eq. (3.7)] and are reported in Table 
3.5. I find the values of the log likelihood are quite close, but the results show that the 
Dixit’s model seems to perform better at describing the dividend data than the Logit 
specification. 
 
Table 3.4 
The Logit estimation 
Stock GE NY Times Duquesne MEG Murphy Midland 
Cons
 
-1.295*** 
(0.2595) 
-1.240*** 
(0.3193) 
-2.073*** 
(0.3838) 
-1.037*** 
(0.3838) 
-2.351*** 
(0.3714) 
-1.714*** 
(0.3045) 
Z t  0.6176 
(4.0089) 
0.5692 
(6.5593) 
3.2423 
(2.3148) 
-0.0679 
(2.3148) 
6.0766 
(8.8411) 
10.7763 
(17.3866) 
log L -76.7650 -80.0206 -70.4114 -79.2069 -48.4413 -64.3322 
Obs 146 149 162 138 149 142 
Note: Asymptotic Standard errors are in the parentheses. Asterisk (*) denote statistically significant at the   
10% level. Double-asterisk (**) denotes statistically significant at the 5% level. Tri-asterisk (***)   
denotes statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 3.5 
Log likelihood value for menu-cost and Logit model  
Stock Menu Cost Logit 
GE -76.7392* -76.7650 
NY Times -79.9871* -80.0206 
Duquesne -70.3930* -70.4114 
MEG -79.1529* -79.2096 
Murphy -48.3683* -48.4413 
Midland -64.1263* 64.3322 
Note: Asterisk (*) denotes the better model based on Log likelihood value. The comparison results are  
consistent with the results if I look at the Bayesian criterion (SBC) suggested by Schwarz(1978). 
 
I next compare the performance of the ACH model, the Logit and the Dixit’s 
model. To maintain the consistency within a two-parameter model on the comparison to 
the Dixt and Logit specification, I estimate the ACH (1, 0) model with 1=Z t . That is, I 
solve Eq. (2.8) for 1=m , 0=r ; I only take the most recent duration of dividend change 
into account. This condition is substituted into Eq. (2.12). The hazard rate with 1=Z t  
can be written as, 
[ ]1
1
1)(
1 += −+ uh tnt αλ                                                                                          (3.10) 
where α  denotes one parameter for translating the previous duration between changes 
in the dividends and a hazard rate. That is, the probability of a dividend change in 
quarter t+1, ht 1+ , depends linearly on the most recent lagged duration u tn 1)( −  and 1=Z t . 
 The result of ACH (1, 0) model with 1=Z t  [Eq (3.10)] is reported in Table 3.6. 
α  is allowed to be negative for obtaining the convergence in the ACH model, indicating 
negative serial correlation. In Table 3.6, α  shows negative numbers in three stocks 
(stock NY Times, MEG and Murphy). That is, if a manager adjusts the dividend payout 
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in the previous quarter, then the probability of changing dividend in this current period is 
a little less.  
Table 3.7 reports the comparison results among these three models, I find the 
ACH (1, 0) model is the best specification for three of these six stocks. The menu-cost 
model is also the best for three of six stocks. The Logit specification does not out 
perform the other two specifications. The overall results suggest adjustment costs and 
the durations between changes in the dividends could help describe the observed 
dividend process.  
 
Table 3.6 
ACH(1, 0) estimation (with 1=Z t ) 
Stock GE NY Times Duquesne MEG Murphy Midland 
Cons
 
1.3791 
(1.6991) 
3.5820*** 
(0.8132) 
2.0921 
(2.0276) 
2.9957 
(2.0286) 
9.1402*** 
(3.9863) 
-1.2468 
(4.3103) 
α  0.5369 
(0.4549) 
-0.0456 
(0.0867) 
0.4940 
(0.4003) 
-0.0427 
(0.5067) 
-0.0207 
(0.3075) 
1.1712 
(0.9520) 
log L -76.0954 -79.9342 -69.5284 -79.2025 -48.6543 -63.4774 
Obs 146 149 162 138 149 142 
Note: Asymptotic Standard errors are in the parentheses. Asterisk (*) denote statistically significant at the   
10% level. Double-asterisk (**) denotes statistically significant at the 5% level. Tri-asterisk (***)   
denotes statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
Table 3.7 
Log likelihood value for alternative models 
Stock Menu Cost Logit ACH 
GE -76.7392 -76.7650 -76.0954* 
NY Times -79.9871 -80.0206 -79.9342* 
Duquesne -70.3930 -70.4114 -69.5284* 
MEG -79.1529* -79.2096 -79.2025 
Murphy -48.3683* -48.4413 -48.6543 
Midland -64.1263* 64.3322 -63.4774 
Note: Asterisk(*) denotes the best model based on Log likelihood value. The comparison results are  
consistent with the results if I look at the Bayesian criterion (SBC) suggested by Schwarz(1978). 
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3.5. Empirical results for the decision-making delays 
Decision-making delays arise when managers need a length of time to determine 
the dividend change in response to an observed gap between the actual and target 
dividend. For instance, the stochastic structure of target dividend may lead to managers 
needing more time decide the dividend payout. In such a case, the former quarters’ gap 
may contain additional predictive power for a dividend change. This differs from the 
menu-cost model, in which the current quarter’s gap dd tt *−  is the only factor 
influencing the probability of a dividend change at quarter t+1. 
The Logit specification and the ACH model offer a convenient framework for 
investigating the role of additional explanatory variables. Subsequently, I now outline 
the use both models to investigate the other explanatory variables besides dd tt *−  as 
factors that might influence the decision to a dividend change. 
If there are delays in manager’s ability to process information, the former 
quarter’s gap between dividend and target level can predict the probability of a dividend 
change in quarter t+1. Dividend adjustments are determined quarterly, and there are four 
quarters in a year.  Thus, I examine the relation between decision delays at period 1−t , 
2−t  and the probability of a dividend change at t+1. The former gaps, dd itit *−− −  
2,1=i  are added into Z t  in the Logit and the ACH (1, 1) model12 for examining the 
                                                 
12 The ACH (1, 1) model is specified as the following 
[ ]Zh ttnt ξψλ ')(1
1
+=+
,     where ψβαψ 1)(1)()( −− += tntntn u  
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explanatory power of a dividend change. I test if a prior quarter’s gap, dd itit *−− − , is a 
better predictor of the probability of a dividend change at t+1.  
 If the previous quarter’s gap dd tt * 11 −− −  is tested for decision delays, the model is 
estimated using:
 
 
( )'* 11* ,,1 ddddZ ttttt −− −−=                                                                               (3.11) 
If the former quarter’s gap dd tt * 22 −− −  is tested whether it contains additional 
predictive power, dd tt * 22 −− −  is added as a fourth explanatory variable in Eq. (3.11). The 
P-value for a likelihood test of the null hypothesis in the Logit specification, the 
coefficient of dd itit *−− −  2,1=i  is zero, is reported in the Table 3.8. This test finds the 
evidence of decision delays for four of the six stocks.  
 I repeat to test the hypothesis by using the ACH (1, 1) model of Eq. (3.11). Table 
3.9 shows the P-value for a likelihood test of the null hypothesis, which the coefficient 
of dd itit *−− −  2,1=i  is zero. There is significant evidence of decision delays for three of 
the six stocks in the ACH (1, 1) specification.  
 Taking the results Table 3.8 and Table 3.9 together, I conclude there are delays in 
managers’ ability to process the decisions on dividend payouts. That is, managers’ 
processing delays could account for the stickiness of dividends on some selected stocks.  
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Table 3.8 
Tests for significance of decision delay in Logit specification 
Stock { }dd tt * 11 −− −  { }dd tt * 22 −− −  
GE 0.387 0.767 
NY Times 0.892 0.001*** 
Duquesne 0.024**   0.225  
MEG 0.716 0.932 
Murphy 0.078* 0.314 
Midland 0.366 0.029** 
Notes: Table reports P-value. Asterisk (*) denotes statistically significant at the 10% level, Double asterisk 
(**) denotes statistically significant at the 5% level, Triple-asterisk (***) denotes statistically significant at 
the 1% level. 
 
Table 3.9 
Tests for significance of decision delay in ACH (1, 1) model 
Stock { }dd tt * 11 −− −  { }dd tt * 22 −− −  
GE 0.439 0.182 
NY Times 0.937 0.000*** 
Duquesne 0.134   0.128 
MEG 0.113  0.132 
Murphy 0.199   0.085* 
Midland 0.618   0.006*** 
Notes: Table reports P-value. Asterisk (*) denotes statistically significant at the 10% level, Double asterisk 
(**) denotes statistically significant at the 5% level, Triple-asterisk (***) denotes statistically significant at 
the 1% level. 
 
The second variable, which is added into Z t  in the Logit specification and the 
ACH (1, 1) model to examine the explanatory power of a dividend change, is the 
difference between the actual and target dividend at last change. To keep dividend 
smoothing in the long run, managers might deliberately stretch out dividend changes. 
Hence, I investigate whether managers engage in partial adjustment of dividends at 
quarter )(tlφ .  I let )(tlφ  be the quarter of the stock’s most recent dividend change as of 
quarter t. For example, if mangers changed the dividend in quarter it −  and kept 
dividends unchanged from 1+− it  to t, then ittl −=)(φ . If managers changed the 
dividend in quarter t , then ttl =)(φ . If managers adjust the dividends partially in quarter 
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)(tlφ , then the gap, dd tltl * )()( φφ − , should help predict a dividend change in quarter t+1 
over the value of the current gap dd tt *− . To test this hypothesis, I estimate the model 
using 
( )'* )()(* ,,1 ddddZ tltlttt φφ −−=                                                                             (3.12) 
Table 3.10 reports the results of Logit estimation in Eq. (3.12). I find that none of 
the six stocks indicates the significant evidence of gradual dividend adjustment.  The 
ACH (1, 1) model with Eq. (3.12) is also estimated. In Table 3.11, I find that 
dd tltl * )()( φφ −  helps predict a dividend change significantly for two of the six stocks. That 
is, the size of the gap remaining after the previous correction dd tltl * )()( φφ −  can help to 
predict a dividend change over and above the value of the current gap dd tt *− . It implies 
that some managers deliberately stretch out dividend changes so as to keep dividend 
smoothing in ACH (1, 1) model.  
Taking the results Tables 3.8 and 3.10 (or Tables 3.9 and 3.11) together, the 
former quarters’ gaps, dd itit *−− −  2,1=i  or dd tltl * )()( φφ − , contains the additional 
predictive power on a dividend change in the next period.  These results seem to imply 
that observed dividend adjustments are not consistent with the assumption of Dixit’s 
model, which the probability of a dividend change at 1+t  only depends on the value of 
dd tt *− . 
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Table 3.10 
Tests for significance of gradual dividend adjustment in Logit specification 
Stock { }dd tt * )(1)(1 φφ −  
GE 0.228   
NY Times 0.192   
Duquesne 0.817 
MEG 0.955   
Murphy 0.152   
Midland 0.566   
Notes: Table reports P-value. Asterisk (*) denotes statistically significant at the 10% level, Double- 
asterisk (**) denotes statistically significant at the 5% level, Triple-asterisk (***) denotes statistically 
significant at the 1% level. 
 
Table 3.11 
Tests for significance of gradual dividend adjustment in ACH(1,1) model 
Stock { }dd tt * )(1)(1 φφ −  
GE 0.119   
NY Times 0.045** 
Duquesne 0.293 
MEG 0.175 
Murphy 0.002*** 
Midland 0.373 
Notes: Table reports P-value. Asterisk (*) denotes statistically significant at the 10% level, Double- 
asterisk (**) denotes statistically significant at the 5% level, Triple-asterisk (***) denotes statistically 
significant at the 1% level. 
 
3.6. Empirical results for the dividend adjustment asymmetry 
As analyzed earlier, both the Dixit’s model and Logit (or ACH) specification 
(used to examine decision-making delays) assume that dividend adjustments are 
symmetric. An alternative way to distinguish adjustment costs, decision-making delays 
from the concern on the response of investors is to look at the evidence of asymmetric 
dividend adjustment. It is commonly believed that managers are more willing to increase 
the dividend in response to a rise in target dividends, but either are slow to react 
dividends or do not fully change dividends in response to a decrease in target dividends. 
Thus, the third explanation I investigate is whether the dividend adjustments are 
asymmetric with respect to the variations of dividend gaps. If so, the probability of a 
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dividend change can exhibit an asymmetric response to the positive and negative gaps 
between actual dividends and target dividends. It can be inferred to make the probability 
of adjusting dividends higher to the negative gap ( dd tt *< ) than the probability of 
adjusting to the positive gap ( dd tt *> ). This asymmetric response occurs because of 
manager’s strategic considerations. I use the Logit specification to examine the possible 
asymmetric adjustment of dividends. 
There are four explanatory variables that are used to examine the asymmetric 
responses to a dividend change; the Logit model is estimated using 
[ ]'** ))(1(),1(),(, ddddZ ttttttttt −Ψ−−Ψ−−ΨΨ=                                              (3.13) 
 Let )log( *d
d
t
t
t =Λ  the percentage gap, and ∑Λ=Λ
=
− T
t
tT
1
1 , the average percentage 
markup.  I replaced dd tt *-  in Eq. (3.13) with Λ−Λ _t , the value of the deviation between 
the log of actual and the log of target dividends payout at time t . Figure 3.4 plots the 
percentage gap. Ψt  is a dummy variable, Ψt  is the value of  1 if  0_ >Λ−Λ t  and 0 
otherwise.  I investigate the effect of the sign of the dividend gap on the probability of a 
dividend change in any given quarter. The parameters in Eq. (3.14) are estimated by 
maximizing the likelihood function and are reported in Table 3.12. 
'__
))(1(),1(),(,  Λ−ΛΨ−−Ψ−Λ−ΛΨΨ= tttttttZ                                            (3.14) 
 For five of the six stocks, the coefficient Ψ−1 t  in Eq. (3.14) is larger than the 
coefficient on Ψt  which means that mangers are more likely to increase the dividend 
payout when ε−=Λ−Λ _t  than it is to change the dividend when ε=Λ−Λ _t  for ε  a 
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small positive number. A second source of asymmetry is that the coefficient of 
))(1(
_Λ−ΛΨ−− t t  is also bigger than the coefficient of )(
_Λ−ΛΨt t  in five of six stocks. 
This implies managers are more likely to increase the dividends when ε−=Λ−Λ _t  than 
to change the dividends when ε=Λ−Λ _t  for ε  a large positive number.  That is, for big 
changes, managers are more likely to increase dividends on the negative deviation gaps 
than to change dividends on the positive gaps; for small changes, managers are also 
more likely to increase dividends on the negative deviation gaps than to change 
dividends on the positive gaps. 
 
Table 3.12 
Asymmetric Logit estimates 
Stock GE NY Times Duquesne MEG Murphy Midland 
Pos Const 
 
-1.404*** 
(0.3851) 
-2.081*** 
(0.6330) 
-2.129 *** 
(0.6748) 
-1.315*** 
(0.5273) 
-3.291*** 
(0.9538) 
-3.126*** 
(0.8845) 
Pos gap 
 
0.431 
 (2.6204) 
1.053 
(2.4116) 
0.640 
(3.3816) 
0.214 
 (4.1386) 
1.982 
(6.5078) 
3.131 
(2.8332) 
Neg Const 
 
-1.195** 
(0.4853) 
-1.741*** 
(0.5479) 
-2.576 *** 
(0.6931) 
-0.861*** 
(0.4286) 
-2.088*** 
(0.6285) 
-1.915** 
(0.5584) 
Neg gap 
 
0.315  
(2.3300) 
4.663 
(2.1955) 
7.380** 
 (3.6396) 
0.231 
 (3.8650) 
3.341 
 (2.7663) 
4.691 
(3.0569) 
Log L -76.6161 -73.7813 -68.0589 -78.5401 -44.1340 -59.8268 
Obs 146 149 162 138 149 142 
Note 1: Asymptotic Standard errors are in the parentheses. 
            Asterisk (*) denotes statistically significant at the 10% level, Double-asterisk(**) denotes  
            statistically significant at the 5% level, Triple-asterisk(***) denotes statistically significant at the  
            1% level.   
Note 2: The coefficient of Pos Const is Ψt  , the coefficient of  Pos gap is )( Λ−ΛΨ tt    , the coefficient of     
            Neg Const is Ψ−1 t  , the   one of  Neg gap is ))(1( Λ−ΛΨ−− t t . 
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Fig. 3.4. The gap percentage between actual dividend and target dividend 
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Figure 3.5 plots the asymmetry of dividend changes in the Logit specification Eq. 
(2.6) for Z t  given by Eq. (3.14) as a function of Λ−Λ _t  for each stock. It indicates the 
probability that managers change their dividends in quarter t+1 when the gap percentage 
between actual dividends d t  and target dividends d t*  vary from –25 to 25 percentages.  
To examine the possibility of an asymmetric response of dividend adjustment, I 
compare the Logit specification with Eq. (3.15) to Eq. (3.14) by a likelihood ratio test.  
'_
,1 

 Λ−Λ= ttZ                                                                                               (3.15) 
These results are shown in Table 3.13. In four of six stocks, I can reject the null 
hypothesis of symmetry adjustment with respect to dividend gap at the 10% level of 
significance. These four stocks (stock NY Times, Duquesne, Murphy and Midland) are 
much less likely to change the dividend in response to a positive gap, since managers are 
more reluctant to send the bad signals to the investors by lowering the dividends. That 
leads managers to postpone a dividend change even if external finance is costly and they 
then might lose the opportunity of investing on the projects paying above-market rates of 
return. Thus, I conclude these managers seem concern about the responses of investors 
to a dividend change; that is another possible explanation for dividend stickiness on 
these selected stocks.  
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Fig. 3.5. Probability of a dividend change 
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Table 3.13 
Test for significance of asymmetry in Logit specification 
Stock P-Value 
GE 0.898 
NY Times 0.010*** 
Duquesne 0.100* 
MEG 0.514 
Murphy 0.069* 
Midland 0.016** 
Notes: Table reports P-value. Asterisk (*) denotes statistically significant at the 10% level, Double- 
asterisk (**) denotes statistically significant at the 5% level, Triple-asterisk (***) denotes statistically 
significant at the 1% level. 
 
3.7. Conclusions 
The observed dividends on individual stocks show that dividends are sluggish 
and discrete. It is not consistent with the Lintner’s stylized fact (1956), which dividend 
adjustments are assumed to change continuously. In this chapter, I examine three 
explanations to account for sticky and discrete dividends. These are menu costs (i.e. a 
constant adjustment cost), decision-making delays, and dividend adjustment asymmetry. 
Following the Garrett and Priestley (2000) model and agency cost issue, the 
current gap between actual and target dividends should be a good predictor on the 
probability of a dividend change in the next period. The Dixit’s menu-cost model (1991) 
seems appropriate to investigate the interpretations of sticky dividend. However, the 
estimates σ MLEMLEb ,  in the menu-cost model are larger than bdirect  andσ direct , since this 
model imputes much more uncertainty about the target dividends than is warranted by 
the data. Even the values of σ 2
2
MLE
MLEb  appear to be some reasonable numbers given the 
interpretation of menu-cost model, I still cannot conclude this model is a fit specification 
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for observed dividend process, since the estimated expected time interval of one cycle, 
σ 2
2
MLE
MLEb , is non-rigid. 
Although it is commonly believed that it is costly to change dividends, my results 
for Dixit’s menu-cost model implies that the dividend process is not accurately described 
as the trade off between a constant adjustment cost of changing dividend and the 
deviation cost when the actual dividend moves away from target level.  It seems more 
reasonable that the adjustment costs of changing dividend are associated with a 
magnitude of dividend deviation. Therefore, I perform an alternative specification, a 
quadratic adjustment cost model, to examine whether the adjustment cost is an important 
factor explaining slow dividend adjustment in the next chapter. 
 In this chapter, I find there is evidence of decision-making delays for selected 
stocks. That is, managers might need longer time to process the information about the 
stochastic structure of target dividends. That might be one possible explanation for 
dividend stickiness. Another important finding is the probability of a dividend change 
seems to be asymmetry. In such a case, managers are more likely to increase dividends 
on the negative gaps than change dividends on the positive gaps. It reflects managers are 
concerned about the responses of investors to dividend changes. The asymmetry pattern 
is another explanation in accounting for sticky dividends. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
THE ADJUSTMENT COST OF DYNAMIC BEHAVIOR OF DIVIDEND  
 
4.1. Introduction 
 One of the important features in the stock market is the sluggish adjustment of 
dividends. However, few studies analyze the determinants of dividend smoothing. In the 
chapter III, I examined three possible explanations: menu-costs, decision-making delays, 
and dividend adjustment asymmetry to account for sticky dividends.  Dixit’s model is 
used to investigate whether the adjustment costs could explain the sticky dividends for 
some selected individual stocks. The adjustment costs in Dixit’s specification remain 
unchanged irrespective the magnitude of deviation between current and previous 
dividend.13 The empirical result suggests that Dixit’s model cannot accurately describe 
the dividend process with a constant adjustment costs.  
 In this chapter, I analyze the dynamic dividend behavior of the aggregate stock 
market. I take another empirical look at adjustment costs as one possible explanation for 
slow adjustments of aggregate dividends. One alternative specification, a quadratic 
adjustment cost model, is used to examine whether adjustment costs can explain the 
slow adjustment process of aggregate dividends.  
                                                 
13 In the Dixit’s model, managers are assumed to minimize the total loss resulting from the deviation of 
dividends from target levels and the constant adjustment cost of changing dividends, g .  
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 Following Garrett and Priestley’s model (2000), managers in setting dividends 
are assumed to minimize the loss resulting from the deviations of dividends from target 
levels. In addition, most managers avoid making changes in dividends since the potential 
adjustment costs could arise. In chapter III, the adjustment costs are assumed to be 
constant, but the empirical results imply that Dixit’s model is not an appropriate model 
to describe the sluggish adjustment of dividends for individual stocks. Thus, in this 
chapter, the adjustment costs are assumed to be related to the magnitude of deviation 
between changes in dividends. 
Since the quadratic adjustment cost model can incorporate the deviations of 
dividends from target levels and varying adjustment costs, this specification is set up to 
investigate whether the adjustment cost is one explanation for sluggish aggregate 
dividend in the stock market. The quadratic function can generate a series of dividend 
decisions to minimize the total discounted sum of adjustment loss in the long run. That 
could be used to assess the slow adjustment process of dividends. If the adjustment costs 
are assumed to be an important factor explaining slow aggregate dividend adjustment, 
then the relative weight factor, the cost of dividends deviating from target levels to the 
adjustment costs, should be smaller. That is, this chapter estimates the structural 
parameters (the relative weight factor and discount factor) of a dynamic dividend 
problem.  
 There are two important issues to consider when estimating the quadratic 
adjustment cost specification of dividends. First, the indexes (dividend, earnings or stock 
price) in stock market are nonstationary )1(I , and there is one cointegrating relation 
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among these indexes (in the sense of Engle and Granger, 1987). Second, the error terms 
in the Euler equation are composite and correlated with the indexes. I find the two-step 
estimation procedure (proposed by Dolado, Galbraithand and Banerjee, 1991) can be 
used to reasonably estimate the structural parameters in the quadratic adjustment cost 
model even when the indexes in the stock market are nonstationary. The first step is to 
estimate the cointegrating regression between dividends and earnings (stock prices). The 
second step is to apply the GMM method to estimate the parameters in the Euler 
equation.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 4.2 describes the 
quadratic adjustment cost model and derives the Euler equation. In section 4.3, describes 
the estimation of Euler equation. In section 4.4, describes the data. In section 4.5, reports 
the empirical results. Section 4.6, concludes.  
 
4.2. The quadratic adjustment cost model 
 Sargent (1978) and Kennan (1979) were the first to estimate quadratic adjustment 
cost models. Kennan(1979) proposed a two-step estimation procedure to estimate the 
Euler equation, however, it was only applied to stationary variables. Delado et al. (1991) 
proposed alternative estimation strategies for the variables that are integrated of order 
one or two. Amano and Wirjanto (1997a, b) used this two-step estimation method to 
estimate the adjustment costs of imports in Canada and the United States, the adjustment 
costs of dynamic labor demand when the series are all nonstationary. 
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 In the quadratic adjustment cost specification, the representative manager in the 
stock market is assumed to be rational and control dividends, d t  (measured in natural log 
units), to minimize the quadratic cost of adjusting dividends in the long run, given a log 
of target dividends. 
[ ]212*∞
0
)-()-(∑
∞
0
ddddEMin jtjtjtjt
j
j
t
jjtd
−++++
=
+
=+
ϑβ
                                                       
(4.1)
 
where Et  is the expectations operator conditional on the managers’ information at time 
t, d jt+  is the log of dividend in period jt + , d jt*+  is the log of target dividend in period 
jt + ,  and β  is the discount rate, 10 << β .The parameter ϑ  reflects the relative cost of 
deviating from the log of target dividend versus the cost of  adjusting  log of  dividends, 
where .0>ϑ  
The first-order necessary condition at time t in Eq. (4.1) is 
)-(- *1 dddEd ttttt +∆=∆ β                                                                                  (4.2) 
The Euler equation is written as 
dEdddE jt jtjtjtjtjt + ++++++ =+++ *1-1 1-1 β
ϑ
ββ
βϑ     ...2,1,0=j                       (4.3) 
The transversality condition 
{ } 0)-()-(lim 21-2*∞→ =+ ++++ ddddE TtTtTtTtTtT β                                                      (4.4) 
I define jts +≡  
.1- *1-1 dEdEdEdE ssssss ss β
ϑ
β =Ω++
                                                             (4.5) 
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where =Ω β
βϑ ++1 211 >++= ββ
ϑ  
I rewrite Eq. (4.5) as 
dEdEBB sSss
*
1
12 1
β
ϑ
β =

 −Ω+− −−−                                                                  (4.6) 
where the operator B is defined by dEdEB jssssj +− ≡  for all j  
I multiply both sides by β−  to get: 
[ ] .1 *112 dEdEBB ssss ϑββ −=+Ω− −−−                                                                 (4.7) 
Then I factor the polynomial [ ]112 +Ω− −− BB ββ  as  
=+Ω− −− 112 BB ββ ))(())(( 2112121211 λλβλλββλλβ ++−=−− −−−− BBBB  
so that, I require 
Ω=+ λλ 21                                                                                                         (4.8) 
βλλ
1
21 =                                                                                                           (4.9) 
The above second equality establishes that .1
1
2 βλλ =  
From Eq. (4.8) and Eq. (4.9), it is known that both λ1  and λ2  are positive and at 
least one of the pair is greater than one. I solve Eq. (4.8) and Eq. (4.9) to get: 
2
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2
βλ −Ω±Ω= , and    
)4(
2
21 ββλ −Ω±Ω=  
where 042 >−Ω β  , so λ1  and λ2  are not complex numbers.  
dEdEBB ssss *11211 ))(( ϑλλβ −=−− −−−                                                              (4.10) 
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I assume that one of the roots exceeds 1 (λ2 ); the other necessarily is less than 1 
(λ1 ). In Eq. (4.10), I divide both sides by )( 12 B−−λβ  
dE
B
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 Then, the above equation can be expressed as  
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Manager’s problem at time t is to set d t  and devise a strategy for setting { }∞=+ 1jjtd  
to minimize the discounted present value of the adjustment loss. Eq. (4.12) is a solution 
to the Euler equation for solving Eq. (4.1). 
That is, 
dEdd ijtjti
i
jtjt
*
0
1111 )( +++
∞
=
−++ ∑+= βλλϑλ                                                             (4.13) 
 Dividends at any period t are assumed to follow the stochastic process in  Eq. 
(4.13) by seeing Eq. (4.12). 
dEdd itti
i
tt
*
0
1111 )( +
∞
=
− ∑+= βλϑλλ                                                                       (4.14) 
where λ1  is the smaller stable root. The log of dividend at period t is set as a weight of 
previous log of dividend and the expectations sum of discounted future fraction log of 
target dividends.  
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Eq. (4.14) can also be rewritten as the following,14  
dEdd itti
i
tt
*
0
11111 )()1)(1( +
∞
=
− ∑−−+= βλλβλλ                                                     (4.15) 
 Next, I specify the level target dividends, Dt* . One of the Lintner’ list of stylized 
facts (1956), target dividends are specified as some percentage of earning Y t . Marsh and 
Merton (1987) suggested that the stock prices Pt  could be one indicator to determine the 
target dividends.  Therefore, I specify these two different relationships between level 
target dividend Dt*  and level earnings Y t  / stock prices Pt . The target variable in the 
quadratic adjustment cost specification is always assumed to be linearly related with 
some exogenous variables (Kennan, 1979; Dolado et al. , 1991; Amano and Wirjanto 
,1997a, b). Thus, the level target dividends, Dt* , here are specified as Eq. (4.16), 
υ ttt rD +Γ=*                                                                                                      (4.16) 
where Γt  is either level of earnings Y t  or level of stock prices Pt , r  is a constant 
parameter,  the long-run target payout ratio. υ t  is the error term known by managers at 
period t. 
 I take log of Eq. (4.16) 
υ ttt rD loglogloglog * +Γ+=                                                                           (4.17) 
Eq. (4.17) is written as  
να ttt Hd ++=*                                                                                              (4.18) 
                                                 
14 In Eq. (4.7), λ1  is the smaller stable root for the Euler equation, that is, 01121 =+Ω− λβλβ . I 
therefore get )1)(1( 111 λβλλϑ −−= .   
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where Dd tt ** log=   , rlog=α , Γ= ttH log ,  and υν tt log= , ν t  is  assumed to be a 
white noise process. 
H t  is assumed to follow an independent random walk (see Table 4.1, 
Yy tt log= or Pp tt log=  is consistent with this assumption), that is, 
eaHL tt +=− )1(                                                                                            (4.19) 
where a is a constant and et  is a white noise term. 
 
Table 4.1 
Random walk test (Augmented-Dickey-Fuller test without lagged terms) 
Variable Lag Order ADF t-statistic Critical Value (5%) 
yt  0 1.729155 -1.941023 
pt  0 1.559500 -1.941023 
Notes: Critical values are at 5% significance level. 
          yt  denotes the log of earnings, pt denotes the log of stock prices. 
         * indicates rejection of null at 5 % critical value.  
 
 I replace Eq. (4.18) and Eq. (4.19) into Eq. (4.15) and get, 
νλβλλλαλλ ttt aHdL )1)(1()1()1()1()1( 111111 −−+−+−+−=−                (4.20) 
In Eq. (4.20), the smaller stable root λ1  lies inside the unit circle, H t  variable is 
)1(I , the white noise ν t  is )0(I . Then d t  must follow )1(I  process. Eq. (4.20) implies 
the cointegration restriction between d t  and H t  in this quadratic adjustment cost model. 
I rearrange Eq. (4.20) and find  
κα ttt Had +++=                                                                                         (4.21) 
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where [ ]eL ttt λνλβλλκ 1111 )1)(1()1(
1 −−−−= . The term κ t  clearly is )0(I since ν t  and 
et  are all )0(I . From Eq. (4.21), it asserts that d t  and H t  are cointegrated with 
cointegrating vector )1,1( − . 
To get an Euler equation that can be estimated, I next substitute Eq (4.18) into 
Eq. (4.2) to obtain,  
νϑαϑβ tttttt HddEd +−−−∆=∆ + )(1  
                   = [ ] νϑαϑββ ttttttt HddIdEd +−−−∆−∆+∆ +++ )()|( 111                                      
                   = βαϑβ +−−−∆ + )(1 Hdd ttt νϑ ttu ++1                                                     (4.22) 
where dE tt 1+∆  is assumed to be realized by ud tt 11 ++ +∆ , ut 1+  is the expectation error  
( [ ] dIdE ttt 11 | ++ ∆−∆ ). Under rational expectation, 0)( 1 =+uE t . 
Eq. (4.22) then can be rewritten as  
ηαϑβ 11 )( ++ +−−−∆=∆ ttttt Hddd                                                                (4.23) 
where νϑβη ttt u += ++ 11 . Under rational expectation, 01 =+η ttE . As noted earlier, since 
d t  and H t  are cointegrated in Eq. (4.23), I use the two-step estimation procedures 
(suggested by Dolado, Galbraith and Banerjee, 1991; Amano and Wirjanto, 1997a, b) to 
estimate the structure parameters ϑβ ,  in Eq. (4.23). 
 
4.3. The estimation of an Euler equation 
In the first step of Dolado et al. (1991) estimation procedures, the long- run target 
payout ratio α  is estimated by the cointegrating regression: 
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ξα ttt Hd ++=                                                                                              (4.24) 
where [ ]eL ttt λνλλβλξ 1111 )1)(1()1(
1 −−−−=  
Since log dividends and log of earnings (log of stock prices) are both )1(I  in Eq. 
(4.24), as noted earlier, it allows one cointegrating vector )1,1( −  between log of 
dividends and log of earnings ( log of stock prices).  From Eq (4.24), let Θt  be the 
difference between d t  and H t .  
Hd ttt −=Θ                                                                                                     (4.25) 
I estimate the target dividend payout out ratio α  by finding the expectation of 
the difference, )(ΘtE  in Eq. (4.25).  
Eq. (4.23) can be written as  
ηϑβ 11 ++ +−∆=∆ tttt Zdd                                                                                 (4.26) 
where HdZ ttt −−= α . 
In the second step of the estimation procedures (Dolado et al., 1991), since d t 1+∆  
and Z t  are correlated with the error term η 1+t  and all the variables are )0(I  in Eq. (4.26),  
Dolado et al. (1991) suggested to use instrumental variable method to estimate the 
parameters in Eq. (4.26).  Thus, the Generalized Method of Moments (Hansen, 1982) is 
used to estimate the parameters under conditions about the error structure in Eq. (4.26) 
(Amano and Wirjanto, 1997a, b). I can find one set of instruments I t  such that the 
moment condition 0)( 1 =+ IE ttη . 
The variable Z tˆ  is estimated by using the first stage, Eq. (4.26) can be written as,  
 57
ηϑβ 11 )ˆ( ++ +−∆=∆ tttt Zdd                                                                              (4.27) 
where HdZ ttt −−= αˆˆ , αˆ  is the expectation of the difference between d t  and H t , 
)(ΘtE , in Eq. (4.25) . Dolado et al. (1991) suggested the discount rate β  and the 
relative weight ϑ  in Eq. (4.27) could be directly estimated by the generalized 
instrumental variable method. GMM procedure here is used to estimate the structure 
parameters β  and ϑ  in Eq. (4.27). The instruments include a constant and the lag values 
of d t∆ . 
 
4.4. Data 
The monthly data of S&P 500 are used from 1871: Jan to 2003: Sep. I use the 
natural log of dividend, earnings and stock price. The time series (dividends, earnings, 
and stock prices) in levels and in log are shown in Figures 4.1-1, 4.1-2, 4.2-1 and 4.2-2. 
The variables are examined by using Augmented-Dickey-Fuller test. The test statistics 
for the variables are reported in Table 4.2. I find that the variables (log dividends, log 
earnings, and log price) fail to reject the null of nonstationarity. That is, d t , yt  and pt  
all follow )1(I processes; the first differences follow )0(I . Since log of stock prices (log 
of earnings) and log of dividends are all )1(I , then these two variables (log of stock 
prices with log of dividends, or log of earnings with log of dividends) should have one 
cointegrating relationship. Tables 4.3-1 and 4.3-2 reports the result of the Johansen type 
likelihood ratio tests (1995). It indicates that the existence of one cointegrating vector 
between log of dividends and log of earnings (log of stock prices). 
 58
Table 4.2  
Test of the time series data in Augmented-Dickey-Fuller tests.  
Variables ADF lags ADF t-statistic Critical value  
d t  2 -1.864509 -2.863155 
yt  2 -2.329963 -2.863155 
pt  1 -1.113340 -2.863153 
d t∆  1 -16.47575* -2.863153 
yt∆  1 -12.42056* -2.863153 
Pt∆  0 -30.12070* -2.863152 
Notes: Critical values are at 5% significance level. 
          yt  denotes the log of earnings, pt denotes the log of stock prices. 
           * indicates rejection of null at 5 % critical value.  
 
4.5. The empirical results 
 As mentioned in section 4.3, I first estimate the long-run parameter α  in Eq. 
(4.23). In Eq. (4.25), Θt  is the difference between log of dividends and log of earnings 
(log of stock prices). Table 4.4 summarizes the results of unit root tests on Θt . This 
variable appears stationary. It implies that there is one cointergrating relationship )1,1( −  
between log of dividends and log of earnings (log of stock prices). α  is estimated by 
finding the expectation of the difference between d t  and H t . An important issue is the 
specification of target dividends. 
If target dividends are related to earnings--- YrD tt =* , 
5115.0)(ˆ −=−=Θ= ydE tttα  
That is, YD tt 5996.0* =  ( )er α= . It interprets that the long-run target payout ratio 
r  is 0.5996; which means target dividends are 59.96 % of earnings. The time series in 
levels of actual dividends and the estimated target dividends are shown in Figure 4-3-1. 
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Fig. 4.1-1. Time series used in levels: sample 1871:01-2003:09 
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Fig. 4.1-2. Time series used in levels dividend and earnings (stock prices): 
                                     sample 1871:01-2003:09 
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Fig. 4.2-1.  Time series used in Log: sample 1871:01-2003:09 
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Fig. 4.2-2. Time series used in Log dividend and Log earnings (stock prices) 
                                   sample 1871:01-2003:09 
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Table 4.3-1 
Johansen test for the cointegration (log of dividends and log of earnings) 
Eigenvalue Likelihood Ratio 5  Percent 
Critical Value 
1 Percent 
Critical Value 
Hypothesized No. 
of CE(s) 
0.029561 48.17483 12.53 16.31 None ** 
0.000330 0.523712   3.84   6.51 At most 1 
Notes: *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1%) level 
            Likelihood Ratio test indicates one cointegrating equation at both 5% and 1% levels 
 
Table 4.3-2 
Johansen test for the cointegration (log of dividends and log of stock prices) 
Eigenvalue Likelihood Ratio 5  Percent 
Critical Value 
1 Percent 
Critical Value 
Hypothesized No. 
of CE(s) 
0.013628 22.77205 12.53 16.31 None ** 
0.000618 0.981472 3.84 6.51 At most 1 
Notes: *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1%) level 
            Likelihood Ratio test indicates one cointegrating equation at both 5% and 1% levels 
 
If target dividends are related to stock prices--- PrD tt =* , 
1423.3)(ˆ −=−=Θ= pdE tttα  
 That is, PD tt 0432.0* = .  It implies that the long-run target payout ratio r  is 
0.0432; which means target dividends are 4.32 % of stock prices. The time series in 
levels of actual dividends and the estimated target dividends are shown in Figure 4.3-2. 
 
Table 4.4  
Test of Θt in Augmented-Dickey-Fuller test with drift and trend 
Variable ADF lags ADF t-statistic Critical value 
yd ttt −=Θ  13 -6.433970* -3.412658 
pd ttt −=Θ  13 -6.433970* -3.412658 
Notes: Critical values are at 5% significance level. 
          yt  denotes the log of earnings, pt denotes the log of stock prices. 
            * indicates rejection of null at 5 % critical value. 
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Fig. 4.3-1.  Actual dividend and estimated target dividend (related to 
earnings) in levels: sample 1871:01-2003:09 
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Fig. 4.3-2. Actual dividend and estimated target dividend (related to 
        stock prices) in levels: sample 1871:01-2003:09 
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In the next step, the generalized instrumental variables method is used to estimate 
the structural parameters ϑβ ,  in Eq. (4.27).  I use Hansen’s GMM procedure to estimate 
the structure parameters. The instruments include a constant, lags of d t∆  at time t-1 to 
t-4: I14 , the superscript 1 corresponds to the first lagged value and the subscript 4 
represents the fourth lagged value. 
First, I estimate both the structural parameters β  and ϑ  by directly estimating 
the Euler equation Eq. (4.27). The results are reported in Table 4-5-1 (target dividends 
are related to earnings), and Table 4.5-2 (target dividends are related to stock prices). 
Since there are more instruments than parameters to be estimated in this equation, the 
validity of the model is tested by using Hansen’s J-test for over-identifying restrictions. 
In Tables 4.5-1 and 4.5-2, the J-test results are not significant at 5 % level, that is, J-tests 
are unable to reject the validity of the over-identifying restrictions. In Table 4.5-1, the 
estimated relative cost weight ϑ  is –0.0235; it is not reasonable since ϑ  is assumed to 
be positive.  
 
Table 4.5-1 
The estimate of the Euler equation in the case of YrD tt =*  
Parameter     I14  
β  1.433449** 
(0.326134) 
 
ϑ  -0.023537 
(0.041376) 
 
J -test 
 P-value 
1.6627 
0.6453 
Note: Standard errors are in the parentheses.  Asterisk (*) denotes statistically significant at the 10% level. 
Double-asterisk (**) denotes   statistically significant at the 5% level. Tri-asterisk (***) denotes 
statistically significant at the 1% level.      
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Table 4.5-2 
The estimate of the Euler equation in the case of prD tt =*  
Parameter    I14  
β  1.251774 
(0.814406) 
 
ϑ  0.003402 
(0.227384) 
 
J -test 
 P-value 
1.7311 
0.6300 
Note: Standard errors are in the parentheses.  Asterisk (*) denotes statistically significant at the 10% level. 
Double-asterisk (**) denotes   statistically significant at the 5% level. Tri-asterisk (***) denotes 
statistically significant at the 1% level.  
 
  
In Table 4.5-2, the estimated discount factor β  is 1.2518 which is outside unit 
interval and does not lie in the reasonable ranges for the discount factor. Gregory, Pagan 
and Smith (1993) pointed that it is difficult to identify β  when the target variable H t  
follows )1(I  in the Euler equation. That could explain the unreasonable estimates in the 
Euler equation. Thus, Amano and Wirjanto (1997a, b) first fixed the parameter β  and 
then estimate the parameter ϑ  in the Euler equation when the target variable follows 
)1(I  process. 
Hence, I select the parameter values from the set β  {∈ 0.999, 0.998, 0.997, 
0.996, 0.995, 0.990, 0.985, 0.980 } and estimate the relative cost weight ϑ  in Eq. 
(4.27). Table 4-6-1 (target dividends are related to earnings), and Table 4-6-2 (target 
dividends are related to stock prices) show the results. In the Table 4-6-1, I cannot reject 
the validity of the over-identifying restrictions by using J-tests based on the alternative 
parameter value for β ; the estimates of the relative cost weight ϑ  corresponding to 
β (0.999, 0.998, 0.997, 0.996, 0.995, 0.99, 0.985, 0.98) are all significant at the 1 % 
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level and range between 0.0241 and 0.0266. It implies that the adjustment costs are 
about forty-fold more important than the deviation cost between actual dividend and 
target level in determining the dividend payout.  It suggests the adjustment cost is a 
significant factor influencing the sluggish dividend adjustments. The estimates of ϑ  lie 
within the narrow rages between 0.0241 and 0.0266 and are statistically significant. 
Since the estimates of ϑ  appear to be insensitive to the values of the discount 
parameters—0.999---0.980, it is appropriate to estimate ϑ  over a range of reasonable 
values of the discount factor β . 
In Table 4.6-2, none of J-tests rejects the validity of the over-identifying 
restrictions. The estimated ϑ  corresponding to β  (0.999, 0.998, 0.997, 0.996, 0.995, 
0.99, 0.985, 0.98) ranges between 0.0776 and 0.0835. It implies that the adjustment costs 
are about fourteen-fold more important than the deviation cost between actual dividend 
and target level when managers determine the dividends. The estimates ϑ  also appear to 
be insensitive over a range of discount parameter β  0.999---0.980, although the test 
values are not statistically significant. 
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I also estimate the smaller stable root λ1 . λ1  is solved by calculating the 
quadratic function : 01)1( 121 =+++− λϑβλβ . The parameter ϑˆ  is set equal to the 
estimates presented in Tables 4.6-1 and 4.6-2 corresponding to β (0.999, 0.998, 0.997, 
0.996, 0.995, 0.99, 0.985, 0.98). Since the stable root λ1  satisfies the condition: 
)1)(1( 111 λβλλϑ −−= , it is found there is one negative relation between ϑ  and λ1 . It 
implies that the adjustment costs will get larger when the stable root is approaching 
unity. The estimated parameters λ1  are reported in Tables 4.7-1 and 4.7-2.  In Table 4.7-
1, λ1  ranges between 0.8566 and 0.8573. In Table 4.7-2, λ1  ranges between 0.7579 and 
0.7562. These values are all large (close to unity); it implies adjustment costs of 
changing dividends are high. Thus, it also implies that the estimates ϑ   are consistent 
with the model, even although I first fix the discount factor β . 
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Table 4.6-1: 
The estimate of ϑ  in the Euler equation in the case of YrD tt =*  
β  ϑ  
999.0=β  
J -test 
P-value 
0.024140***  (0.009471) 
 
4.4365 
0.3501 
 
998.0=β  
J -test 
P-value 
0.024268***  (0.009497) 
 
4.4440 
0.3492 
 
997.0=β  
J -test 
P-value 
0.024395***  (0.009524) 
 
4.4517 
0.3483 
 
996.0=β  
J -test 
P-value 
0.024523***  (0.009550) 
 
4.4589 
0.3475 
 
995.0=β  
J -test 
P-value 
0.024651***    (0.009576) 
 
4.4663 
0.3466 
 
990.0=β  
J -test 
P-value 
0.025293***   (0.009710) 
 
4.5030 
0.3422 
 
985.0=β  
J -test 
P-value 
0.025940***   (0.009848) 
 
4.5392 
0.3379 
 
980.0=β  
J -test 
P-value 
0.026591***    (0.009989) 
 
4.5747 
0.3338 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in the parentheses.  Asterisk (*) denotes statistically significant at the 10% 
level. Double-asterisk (**) denotes   statistically significant at the 5% level. Tri-asterisk (***) denotes 
statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 4.6-2:  
The estimate of  ϑ  in the Euler equation in the case of PrD tt =*  
β  ϑ  
999.0=β  
J -test 
P-value 
0.077605  (0.061111) 
 
1.2880 
0.8634 
 
998.0=β  
J -test 
P-value 
0.077917  (0.061294) 
 
1.2852 
0.8639 
 
997.0=β  
J -test 
P-value 
0.078229  (0.061477) 
 
1.2824 
0.8644 
 
996.0=β  
J -test 
P-value 
0.078540  (0.061659) 
 
1.2796 
0.8648 
  
995.0=β  
J -test 
P-value 
0.078851 (0.061841) 
 
1.2768 
0.8653 
 
990.0=β  
J -test 
P-value 
0.080400  (0.062747) 
 
1.2633 
0.8676 
 
985.0=β  
J -test 
P-value 
0.081937  (0.063641) 
 
1.2505 
0.8697 
 
980.0=β  
J -test 
P-value 
0.083467  (0.064535) 
 
1.2381 
0.8718 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in the parentheses.  Asterisk (*) denotes statistically significant at the 10% 
level. Double-asterisk (**) denotes   statistically significant at the 5% level. Tri-asterisk (***) denotes 
statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 4.7-1:   
The estimate of λ1  in the Euler equation in the case of YrD tt =*  
ϑβ ,  λ1  
999.0=β  
024140.0=ϑ  
 
0.8566 
998.0=β  
024268.0=ϑ  
 
0.8567 
997.0=β  
024395.0=ϑ  
 
0.8567 
996.0=β  
024523.0=ϑ  
 
0.8568 
995.0=β  
024651.0=ϑ  
 
0.8568 
990.0=β  
025293.0=ϑ  
 
0.8570 
985.0=β  
025940.0=ϑ  
 
0.8572 
980.0=β  
026591.0=ϑ  
 
0.8573 
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Table 4.7-2:  
The estimate of λ1  in the Euler equation in the case of PrD tt =*  
ϑβ ,  λ1  
999.0=β  
077605.0=ϑ  
 
0.7579 
998.0=β  
077917.0=ϑ  
 
0.7578 
997.0=β  
078229.0=ϑ  
 
0.7577 
996.0=β  
078540.0=ϑ  
 
0.7575 
995.0=β  
078851.0=ϑ  
 
0.7575 
990.0=β  
080400.0=ϑ  
 
0.7570 
985.0=β  
081937.0=ϑ  
 
0.7566 
980.0=β  
083467.0=ϑ  
 
0.7562 
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4.6. Conclusions 
 In this chapter, I use a quadratic adjustment cost model to examine whether the 
adjustment cost is a possible explanation for slow adjustment of aggregate dividend. I set 
up the quadratic adjustment cost specification and derive the dynamic dividend 
adjustment process. One two-step estimation procedure (proposed by Dolado, 
Galbraithand and Banerjee, 1991; Amano and Wirjanto, 1997a, b) is used to estimate the 
structural parameters β  and ϑ  in the quadratic adjustment cot model. 
 I use S&P 500 index as the data. In the first stage of Dolado et al. procedure 
(1991), I find the long-run target payout ratio r  is about 0.5996 if target dividends are 
related to earnings; r  is 0.0432 if target dividends are related to stock prices. In the 
second stage, when I estimate the discount factor β  and the relative cost weight ϑ  by 
directly estimating the Euler equation, I find the estimated cost weight ϑ  is negative in 
the case of YrD tt =* . The estimated discount factor β  is outside of unit interval in the 
case of PrD tt =* . These estimates are not all reasonable. Thus, I select the parameter 
values from the set β  {∈ 0.999, 0.998, 0.997, 0.996, 0.995, 0.990, 0.985, 0.980 } and 
estimate the relative weight ϑ . An important issue is the specification of target 
dividends. If target dividends are related to earnings, then the empirical results suggest 
that the adjustment costs are about forty-fold more important than the deviation costs 
between the actual dividend and the target level in determining the dynamic dividend 
adjustment process. This implies that the adjustment cost might be one possible 
explanation for slow dividend adjustment. If target dividends are specified as proportion 
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to the stock prices, the estimates ϑ  imply similar conclusions with the estimates in the 
earnings case; although the results are not statistically significant.  
In summary, I conclude that the quadratic adjustment cost model reasonably 
describe the dynamic dividend adjustment process for S&P 500 when the discount factor 
is fixed. Thus, the adjustment costs might be one possible explanation for slow 
adjustment process of aggregate dividends. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 In this dissertation, I investigate the sluggish adjustment process of dividend 
payment in the stock market. First, I focus on the sticky and discrete adjustment of 
dividends for the individual stocks. Second, I analyze the sluggish adjustment of 
dividends in the aggregate stock market. 
  A casual investigation of observed dividends for individual stocks shows that 
dividends are sluggish and discrete, this is not consistent with the Lintner’s stylized fact 
(1956), in which dividend adjustments are assumed to change continuously. Thus, I 
examine three possible explanations to account for sticky and discrete dividends: menu-
costs, decision-making delays, and dividend adjustment asymmetry.  
 I reject the menu-cost model as an accurate description of the dividend 
adjustment process. The empirical results imply that decision-making delays and 
dividend adjustment asymmetry might be possible explanations for some individual 
stocks. 
 It is still believed that it is costly to change dividend even though the menu-cost 
model implies that the dividend process is not accurately described as the trade off 
between a constant adjustment cost of changing dividend and the deviation cost of 
dividend from target level.  Therefore, I perform one alternative specification, quadratic 
adjustment cost model, to examine whether the adjustment cost is an important factor 
explaining the slow dividend adjustment. 
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The quadratic adjustment cost specification takes the magnitude of deviation 
between changes in dividends into account. I derive a dynamic dividend adjustment 
process and apply a two-step methodology to estimate the structural parameters in the 
Euler equation.  The empirical result implies adjustment cost might be a significant 
explanation of slow dividend adjustment for S&P 500.  
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APPENDIX 
Suppose managers decide to change the dividend to )()( * tdtd ii =  at any quarter 
ti ,  when bdd tt ii =−− *1 , then the probability which the dividend changes between t and 
t+1 by the probability, either bdd tt >− +* 1 , or bdd tt <− +* 1 . 
The upper bound bdd tt >− +* 1 : 
Prob [ ]bdd tt >− +* 1  
=Prob [ ]ddbdd tttt ** 1* −>−− +  
=Prob 

 −>−− +σσ
ddbdd tttt ** 1*  
=Prob 

 >−− Zbdd tt σ
*
 
= )(
*
σ
bdd tt −−Φ                                                                                                  (A-1) 
where Z  follows standard normal distribution )1,0(N , and Φ  is the cumulative 
distribution function of  a standard normal variable. 
Similarly, the lower bound we have: 
Prob [ ] )(1 ** 1 σ bddbdd tttt +−Φ−=<− +                                                               (A-2) 
From Eq. (A-1) and Eq. (A-2), the probability of a change in dividends between 
quarter t and t+1 , [ ]ddh tt *, , can be approximated by  
[ ]=ddh tt *,  )(1)( ** σσ bddbdd tttt +−Φ−+−−Φ                                                    (A-3) 
 
 82
VITA 
 
NAME: Chun-Li Tsai 
 
Education: 
Ph. D.,      Economics,             Texas A&M University , 2000- Aug 2005  
M.B.A .,                                   National Changhua University of Education, 1997-1999 
B.A. ,      International Trade,  National Chengchi University,   1994-1997 
 
Fields of Specialization: 
Primary: Financial Economics, Monetary/ Macro Economics 
Secondary: Econometrics, International Economics 
 
Permanent Address: #154 Da-Chieh St.  
                                  Ching Shuie, Taichung 
                                   436 Taiwan 
 
 
 
 
 
